Although non-market goods are not directly allocated through markets, some of these goods are allocated through markets in an indirect fashion. Such is the case with conspicuous consumption: people buy market goods (e.g., clothing) to signal their wealth and then increase the probability of obtaining some non-market goods (e.g., admiration). We are the rst to exploit that relationship to measure the market value of those non-market goods by using a revealed-preference approach. We estimate a signaling model using nationally representative data on consumption in the US. We then use this model to obtain welfare implications and perform a counterfactual analysis. Our estimates suggest that for each dollar spent on clothing and cars, the average household obtains approximately 35 cents in net benets from non-market goods. The signaling mechanism seems to be a relatively ecient allocation mechanism because it attains almost 90% of the full potential benets from non-market goods. The unattained benets give an upper bound to the potential gains from economic policy (e.g., a tax on observable goods). The counterfactual analysis suggests that the proportional tax rate on observable goods that would correct the positional externality is in the order of 40%. Additionally, we calculate the unique non-linear tax schedule that would fully correct the externality. Finally, we show that accounting for the consumption of these non-market goods increases the Gini index of consumption inequality by almost 4%.
Introduction
Non-market goods (hereafter NMGs) are goods that people consume but that are not traded in markets (Scitovsky, 1948) . Some examples of NMGs include respect, admiration, relationships, and authority.
Although NMGs are not directly allocated through markets, some NMGs are allocated through markets in an indirect fashion. Such is the case with conspicuous consumption: people buy market goods (e.g., clothing) to signal their wealth and then increase the likelihood of obtaining some NMGs (e.g., admiration). This paper is the rst to exploit that relationship to measure the market value of NMGs by employing a revealed preference approach based on market data. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, this paper is the rst to estimate a signaling model.
There is a growing body of evidence suggesting that people use the consumption of certain observable goods as a signal. For instance, Glazer and Konrad (2006) show that for the donation records of institutions that report the names of their donors in the donation categories (e.g., $1000-$1999 and there is no quantitative measure of its importance. To determine whether conspicuous consumption is a mere curiosity or whether it deserves further attention, we must obtain a quantitative idea of the welfare and policy implications. We estimate a signaling model using nationally representative data on consumption in the US (from the Consumer Expenditures Survey), which we then use to obtain welfare implications and perform a counterfactual analysis. Our estimates suggest that for each dollar spent on clothing and cars, the average household obtains approximately 35 cents in net benets from NMGs. The results suggest that conspicuous consumption is a relatively ecient allocation mechanism that achieves almost 90% of the potential benets from NMGs. The unattained benets provide an upper bound to the potential gains from economic policy, such as a tax on observable goods. To assess how this policy can correct the positional externality, we re-compute the signaling equilibrium under the counterfactual scenario of a proportional tax on observable goods. Additionally, we compute the non-linear tax schedule that would fully correct the externality. Finally, we show that conspicuous consumption can have sizable consequences for welfare inequality because accounting for the consumption of the NMGs increases the Gini index of consumption inequality by almost 4%.
In addition to the literature on conspicuous consumption, this paper also contributes to a large multi-disciplinary literature that studies status concerns (i.e., relative concerns). In particular, economists 1 For a recent review see Heetz and Frank (2011) have long acknowledged the importance of status concerns for diverse economic phenomena, such as the equilibrium distribution of income (e.g., Robson, 1992) , optimal taxation (e.g., Boskin and Sheshinski 1978; Frank, 1985; Ireland, 1994) , monetary policy (Keynes, 1936 2 ), and the formation of asset bubbles (Kindleberger, 1978) . Because many of the NMGs allocated through conspicuous consumption (e.g., admiration and respect) represent status concerns, our measurement of the value of NMGs provides some insight into the magnitude of status concerns.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model of conspicuous consumption that will serve as the basis for the empirical model in Section 3. Section 4 presents the data, and Section 5 shows the estimation results. The last section concludes.
The canonical model of conspicuous consumption
This section presents the canonical model of conspicuous consumption that serves as the basis for the empirical model in the next section.
Consumer behavior
Non-market goods are goods and services that people consume but that cannot be traded in formal markets. Examples of non-market goods include respect, admiration, authority, and relationships.
As in formal markets, there are consumers and suppliers of NMGs. The supplier of an NMG is often interested in providing the NMG to individuals who have certain characteristics. For instance, most people are interested in having good-hearted friends, admiring talented people, and conducting business with wealthy people. However, similar to many other personal attributes, benevolence, talent and wealth cannot be directly observed by everyone in every situation. To overcome the problem of asymmetric information, people often rely on signaling mechanisms. For example, people may volunteer in a charitable organization to signal their altruism or may pursue an educational degree to signal some cognitive skills. According to the wealth-signaling theory of conspicuous consumption, people consume goods that are highly visible to signal that they are wealthy and to increase the likelihood of obtaining NMGs (e.g., Cole et al., 1995) .
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Conspicuous consumption may arise in many dierent situations and may involve a wide variety of goods. This paper will not cover all of the possible forms of conspicuous consumption. Rather, we focus only on the conspicuous consumption that arises in a particular set of situations: interactions among strangers. We dene strangers as people who cannot observe others' wealth but can observe a set of highly visible consumption goods, such as clothing, clothing accessories and cars. As a consequence, the consumption of those highly visible goods can serve as a signal of wealth. Indeed, a growing body of experimental evidence shows that people give preferential treatment to individuals who consume these types of conspicuous goods. For instance, people do not honk as quickly after the trac light turns green if the car ahead of them is more expensive (Doob and Gross, 1968) . When confronted by a person wearing a shirt with an expensive brand logo, people assume more submissive postures than 2 Keynes (1936) argued that workers are less averse to wage cuts when introduced indirectly through ination (as opposed to direct cuts) because relative incomes are not aected. they would if the shirt were digitally modied to have no logo or a cheap brand logo (Fennis, 2008) .
Additionally, people are also more likely to think that a candidate is better suited for a job if he or she wears a shirt with an expensive brand logo (Nelissen and Marijn, 2011).
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Denote z i > 0 to household i's expenditures in observable goods, and u i > 0 to its expenditures in unobservable goods. Let y i ≡ z i +u i denote the total expenditures. That is, the providers of the NMGs can observe z i but not u i nor y i . For the sake of notational simplicity, we start with no heterogeneity in agents' preferences and we also drop the subscripts. Our empirical model only leverages from the intra-temporal margin. 5 We take as given that a given household has decided to consume y at a given point in time, and we study how this household splits y between goods that are observable and goods that are not. Let U (u, z) denote the intrinsic utility from consumption. 6 In absence of NMGs, the household would consumez(y) = arg max z∈[0,y] U (y − z, z). 7 Let V (y) = U (y −z(y),z(y)) denote the corresponding indirect utility function. Note thatz(y) also denotes optimal consumption in the counterfactual scenario where the observable good becomes unobservable, as well as under the scenario where the unobservable good becomes observable (i.e., total consumption is observable).
According to the signaling model of conspicuous consumption, consumers also care about NMGs.
For the sake of notational simplicity, we assume that the utility from consuming NMGs enters additively. 8 The utility from consuming a NMG of size n is given by Φ (n). The suppliers of the NMGs want to provide a greater n to individuals that have higher total consumption (i.e., are wealthier). If y was publicly observable to everyone, they would provide n = Υ (y), with Υ (·) strictly increasing.
Since y is not observable, the potential consumers of the NMGs must incur in conspicuous consumption to signal y. Let z = g(y) be the equilibrium consumption of observable goods as a function of total consumption. As long as g(·) is a monotonically increasing function, the suppliers of the NMGs can use the inverse of that function to infer the consumer's total consumption from the observed consumption:
i.e., y = g −1 (z).
Assume that everyone else is behaving according to g(y), so the suppliers of the NMGs use g −1 (z)
to infer wealth. From the perspective of a single individual, the utility from NMGs as a function of observable consumption is:
The problem of a household with total consumption y is: max
The rst two terms represent the usual trade-o in intrinsic utility from consuming two types of goods under a budget constraint. The third term represents the fact that consuming more of the observable good will also increase how wealthy the consumer is perceived by the suppliers of the NMGs, through g −1 (·), which is a source of utility, through Ψ (·). By the Inverse Function Theorem:
. Since the last equation must be valid for every y, we can write:
So the optimal g(y) must be the one that solves this dierential equation. We need a boundary condition to pin down a particular solution. The boundary condition simply says that the poorest household, with wealth y 0 , should consume exactly as if the visible good was invisible: i.e., g(y 0 ) = z(y 0 ).
A pair of functional forms {U (·) , Ψ (·)} give rise to a perfect-separating equilibrium with z = g(y).
If the conditions given in Mailath (1987) are met, this perfect-separating equilibrium exists and is unique.
10 All the conditions are met at the estimated parameter values from the empirical section.
Many of the conditions are just regularity conditions (e.g. Ψ (y) > 0 ∀y ≥ y 0 ). Two of the conditions are especially important. First, the SOC for (local) utility maximization has to be satised for every y:
Otherwise the FOC that we used in the derivation of the dierential equation would not characterize an optimum to begin with. The second important condition is the single-crossing condition, which
has to be monotonically increasing in y. Since Ψ (y) > 0 ∀y ≥ y 0 , this condition simply states that −U 1 (y − z, z) + U 2 (y − z, z) has to be monotonically increasing in y. Note that −U 1 (y − z, z) + U 2 (y − z, z) gives the change in intrinsic utility from substituting a unit of observable expenditures for a unit of unobservable expenditures at the margin. There is a simple interpretation for this condition. Recall thatz(y), the optimal observable expenditures in absence of NMGs, is dened by −U (y −z(y),z(y))+U 2 (y −z(y),z(y)) = 0. Using the Implicit Function Theorem:
The denominator is the SOC for local maximization of the optimization problem that denesz(y), so it must be negative. Thus, the sign ofz (y) is equal to the sign of the numerator. Since the numerator is the derivative of U 1 (y − z, z) − U 2 (y − z, z) w.r.t. y, then the single-crossing condition 10 In the notation of Mailath (1987) , the utility function would be:Ũ α, α −1 (y) , y = U (y − z, z) + Ψ α −1 (y) , where α stands for total expenditures, y stands for observable expenditures and α −1 (y) stands for the supplier's belief about the wealth of the household given that the household is spending y in observable goods.
implies that the numerator must be positive. In other words, the single-crossing condition implies that, in absence of NMGs, wealthier households would spend strictly more on observable goods (in an absolute sense).
Measuring the market value of NMGs
Two measures are especially important: how valuable the NMGs are, and how much of that value is not attained because of the signaling costs. Figure 1 provides a simple graphical method for performing the welfare analysis. The utility function in the middle provides the total utility attained by the signaling equilibrium W (y). The household attains the benets Ψ(y) − Ψ(0) from signaling, but in exchange, it must distort its consumption towards the observable good, which is costly. The topmost curve depicts the utility in the counterfactual scenario in which the household's wealth becomes public information (i.e., V (y) + Ψ(y)). The household attains Ψ(y) − Ψ(0), but it does not need to distort its consumption towards the observable good in exchange. Finally, the lowest curve depicts a world in which we cast a spell upon a single household such that its consumption of observable goods becomes invisible. As a result, the suppliers of the NMGs will provide this household with the same level of NMGs that they provide to the poorest individual in the economy (i.e., Ψ(0)). 11 This household does not enjoy the gross benets Ψ(y) − Ψ(0) from signaling, but it does not incur any signaling costs either.
Fix wealth at some value y * . The vertical dierence between the middle curve and the lowest curve gives a measure in utils of the Net Benets (NB) from the NMGs (i.e., the utility from NMGs net of the signaling costs). The vertical dierence between the topmost curve and the middle curve gives a measure in utils of the the signaling cost, which we denominate Unattained Benets (UB). The vertical dierence between the topmost and lowest curves gives a measure of the gross benets of the NMGs The Net Benets are dened as the amount N B that would cause the household to be indierent toward losing N B or facing the spell that renders its observable goods invisible: i.e., W (y − N B) = V (y) + Ψ(0). Solving for N B:
The Unattained Benets are dened as the amount U B that would cause the household to be indierent between gaining U B or having their wealth publicized to everyone: i.e., W (y + U B) = V (y) + Ψ(y). Solving for U B:
These equivalent variations are depicted in Figure 1 . Once we estimate the primitives of the structural model, we can use these formulas to compute the market value of the NMGs.
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We assume that the providers of the NMGs do not know about the spell.
12 Note that the empirical model is not able to pin down Ψ(0), so we need to dene the gross benets in this way.
Counterfactual analysis with a tax on observable goods
The possibility of a tax on observable goods is probably one of the most well-known policy implications of the models of conspicuous consumption (e.g., Bagwell and Bernheim, 1996) . Denote τ (z) as the average tax rate on observable goods. The problem of the household becomes:
To characterize the new signaling equilibrium under the presence of the tax, we obtain rst the FOC for an interior solution. Letz τ (y) = argmax z∈[0,y] U (y − z, z(1 − τ (z))) denote the optimal choice if the tax is levied but there are no NMGs. The equilibrium consumption is characterized by the following dierential equation:
Because the signaling equilibrium is still a perfect separation, every household receives the exact same gross benets from the NMGs regardless of the tax schedule. The introduction of the tax distorts the consumption of the taxed good towards zero, which is represented by the multiplier (1 − τ (z) − τ (z)z) in the above formula. However, because households over-consumed the conspicuous good in the rst place, the tax can actually correct a pre-existing distortion instead of creating a new distortion.
For a given hypothetical tax schedule, we can use the estimated primitives of the model to re-compute the signaling equilibrium and perform a counterfactual analysis. Moreover, if we assume a policy objective, we can compute the optimal tax schedule. In the case of a non-linear tax schedule, we will show that there is one exact tax schedule that fully corrects the positional externality.
Examples
One basic implication of the signaling model is that richer households have an extra reason to consume the observable good because they must send a stronger signal. Based on this intuition, a couple of papers have attempted to test the conspicuous consumption model by examining expenditures data. visible goods. Although this evidence is suggestive, it is not conclusive because the positive association between income and spending in visible goods could be the product of the mere shape of consumer preferences. In other words, even if all goods become invisible (such that people cannot use them as signals), the goods that used to be highly observable (e.g., cars) may still be relatively more attractive to richer households (i.e.,z (y) y may be increasing in y). Thus, the ndings of Basmann et al. (1988) and Heetz (2011) could be perfectly consistent with a world with no conspicuous consumption.
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13 Indeed, even if people were using the observable goods as signals, in equilibrium it is possible that the resulting Engel curves are downward sloping.
We illustrate this empirical challenge by using a numerical example. For example, in the green (red) case, the signaling mechanism is an inecient (ecient) allocation mechanism, which implies a large (small) potential gain from introducing a tax on observable goods aimed at correcting the positional externality.
The paper aims to determine which of these cases best represents the world in which we live by using a simple structural estimation.
3 Empirical Model
NLLS estimator
As before, let y i denote household i's total consumption and z i denote household i's observable consumption. Let x i be a vector of household i's characteristics. These characteristics may vary not only over households but also across reference groups. We need to assume parametric functional forms U (·; x, υ) and Ψ(·; x, ω), where υ and ω are vectors of parameters. Note that this formulation allows the household preferences (over both market and non-market goods) to depend on some characteristics of the household x i . 14 A given pair of parameters θ = {υ, ω} will generate a unique (positive) function f (z) characterized by the dierential equation:
We can only obtain an explicit formula for g(y; x, υ, ω) for a limited selection of functional forms.
However, for any functional form we can use standard numerical methods (e.g., Runge-Kutta) to approximate the solution up to computer precision.
The dataset consists of {y
where ξ z i represents classical measurement error and θ 0 are the true parameter values. We can obtain an estimate of θ by Non-linear Least Squares (NLLS):
, then NLLS will yield a consistent estimate for θ. To be conservative, we will t consumption shares instead of the absolute consumption levels. 15 The only peculiarity of the NLLS estimation is that each evaluation of a set of parameter values requires us to solve numerically for a number of dierential equations. If x i diers only by state, then we will need to solve one dierential equation per state. If each household has a unique x i , then we will need to solve for one dierential equation per observation. Lastly, note that we do not account for the left censoring of the expenditures variables. We ignore this issue simply because censoring is not a major concern in the dataset under consideration (i.e., observable expenditures are exactly zero for only 1.3% of the observations). Nevertheless, if censoring were an issue in some other datasets, it could be addressed by the usual methods. 16 
Identication assumption
A non-linear model can be identied even if there are more coecients than variables. However, to avoid being subject to a problem of weak identication, we must check whether there is enough variation in the data to identify each of the primitives. The identication challenge is to disentangle how much of the consumption of observable goods corresponds to signaling purposes (i.e., Ψ(·)) and how much corresponds to mere intrinsic utility (i.e., U (·)). To this end, we need to observe households that face the same U (·) but a dierentΨ(·). Because these households have the same intrinsic utility, the dierences in their observable consumption should be due entirely to signaling. In other words, we need to observe a variable that enters in Ψ(·) (the relevance condition) but is orthogonal to U (·) (the orthogonality condition or exclusion restriction). 17 15 This is equivalent to using one over the square of income as weight in the above NLLS regression. Also, note that we implicitly assume that the relative prices between observable and unobservable goods are the same across all households.
16 For 
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Alternatively, the correlation between mean income in the reference group and observable consumption can be rationalized as a product of signaling if the suppliers of the NMGs are not interested in the absolute wealth of the consumer but in the consumer's ranking within the distribution of wealth in the reference group. Indeed, this pattern will emerge whenever the members of a given reference group have to compete with each other for a roughly xed supply of NMGs, in a tournament fashion.
For example, it is plausible that a consumer obtains a greater value in NMGs (e.g., admiration) by driving a Ferrari in Salem, MA, than by driving the same Ferrari in Beverly Hills, CA. Although someone capable of aording a Ferrari would be among the wealthiest in Salem, he or she would not compare so favorably to the residents of Beverly Hills. In Appendix A, we provide a stylized model along these lines. This model predicts that conspicuous consumption should depend negatively on the mean income in the reference group.
Regarding the orthogonality condition, we see no obvious reasons for believing that the mean income in the reference group should aect preferences over market goods. In the empirical section, we will perform a couple robustness tests based on the identication strategy suggested by Charles et
Functional form assumptions
Let x 1 and x 2 denote the (possibly overlapping) vectors that include all variables that aect preferences over market goods and non-market goods, respectively. Preferences over market goods will follow the functional form U (u, z; x 1 , υ) = ln(u) + β(u + z; x 1 , υ) · ln(z). As a result, the share spent in 18 Such argument is very clear when the reference group is small, like a neighborhood, in which case there is something like a poorest individual in the group. However, the argument is less straightforward when reference groups are larger:
e.g., the dierence between the poorest individual in one state and the poorest individual in some other state may not be signicant, even if one state is on average much richer than the other. If every state has the same lowest bound for wealth, then the signaling model presented above predicts that the equilibrium conspicuous consumption should not depend upon the mean or any other property of the distribution of y in the reference group. This does not mean that this interpretation is invalid, although it means that we need further assumptions, like state dierences in subsistence levels.
observable goods in absence of NMGs would be given byz (y;x1,υ) y
. This is a fairly exible specication, since we can match virtually any Engel curve by choosing the function β(·) appropriately. The baseline specication assumes β(y; x 1 , υ) = υ 0 + υ y y + υ x x 1 , where υ x is a vector of parameters. If υ y > 0 (υ y < 0), then the share spent in observable goods in absence of NMGs is increasing (decreasing) in y. Regarding preferences over NMGs, we choose the functional form Ψ(y; x 2 , ω, k) = exp (ω 0 + ω x x 2 ) · y κ , where ω x is a vector of parameters. The exponential function is just a convenient way of scaling Ψ(·). The most important variable in x 2 will be the mean income in the reference group, denoted byȳ. According to the discussion in the previous subsection, we should expect ωȳ to be negative. In the empirical section we test the sensitivity of the estimation results to the use of alternative functional form assumptions.
We can provide some intuition about the variation in that data that will identify each one of the parameters. The parameter υ 0 will be identied by the share of expenditures in observable goods as total expenditures go to zero. The identication behind υ y and ωȳ is more subtle. Imagine that we have two households that are identical in every dimension, except that they reside in dierent states with dierent mean state incomes. Both households face the same preferences over market goods, so dierences in consumption of z between the two households should be attributed entirely to wealth signaling. The parameter ωȳ will be identied by how, for a given level of y, the consumption of observable goods increases with the household's ranking in the distribution of total consumption in the reference group. While the parameter υ y will be identied by how, for a given ranking in the distribution of wealth, a household consumes a higher share in observable goods as we increase y. The parameter κ will be pinned down by the relative importance of NMGs across poor and rich households, with a larger value of κ implying that the NMGs are relatively more important among the rich. 19
Finally, it is important to note that economic theory will play a key role in identifying the parameter values, as they will be translated to consumption choices through the unique dierential equation that characterizes the signaling equilibrium.
Data
The main source of data is the Consumer Expenditures Survey (CEX). We use the dataset from 21 On average, each household spends $364 per month on this item (6% of total expenditures). Hence, the average monthly household expenditure on clothing and cars is $550 (11% of total expenditures). Table 1 Clothing and car consumption mainly serve as a signal of wealth in random interactions with strangers.
Most often, people interact with strangers who live and work in the same geographic areas. Based on this insight, we use the household state of residence as a proxy for the reference group.
This proxy is
clearly not an exact measure of the reference group, but it is a reasonable approximation. Moreover, we will also use state-race cells as an alternative proxy for the reference groups. We compute the mean income in each state (and state-race cell) by using the weighted averages from all of the respondents in the March Supplement of the Current Population Survey during the sample period from 1993-2002. Table 2 shows the parameter estimates. 24 We report heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parenthesis (White, 1980) . Column (1) reports the baseline specication. ωȳ (s) is the coecient on mean state income. As expected, this coecient is negative and statistically signicant, meaning that a given consumption in observable goods is rewarded with a lower value of NMGs in states with higher mean income. A one standard deviation increase in the mean state income is associated with a 40% decrease in the valuation of NMGs. The positive estimate of υ y suggests that, even if the observable goods did not play a signaling role, richer people would still consume a higher share on them.
Estimation Results
Columns (2) through (7) oer many robustness tests. Although most coecients are directly comparable across specications, we can provide a much more straightforward way to compare the implications across dierent specication. For each specication we report the implied market value of the NMGs, using the equivalent variation presented in Subsection 2.2. Table 2 First, we test the sensitivity of the results to the functional form assumption about the utility over market goods in the baseline specication, β(y; υ) = υ 0 + υ y y. In particular, we are concerned about how this specication is not exible regarding the concavity ofz (y) y
. In order to relax that restriction, we replace β(y) by a spline. Column (2) indicates that the results are almost exactly the same under the alternative assumption (the results are also the same if we simply add a quadratic term to β(·)).
Second, we test the sensitivity of the results to the functional form assumption about the utility over NMGs. In column (3) we allow mean income to enter through a polynomial instead of the exponential:
i.e., Ψ(y;ȳ(s), ω, k) = Note that the baseline specication does not include other household characteristics (x) besides y andȳ(s). For instance, it is possible that younger people, ceteris paribus, value the NMGs relatively more (or equivalently, that the suppliers of the NMGs are willing to provide a NMG of greater value to a younger individual). A priori we cannot determine whether the omission of household characteristics (i.e., x 1 and x 2 ) would lead to an under-estimation or an over-estimation of the average Net Benets from NMGs. In column (4) we let some household characteristics (x c ) affect preferences over both market and non-market goods: i.e., β(y; x c , υ) = υ 0 + (υ y + υ x x c ) y and Ψ(y; x c , ω, k) = exp ω 0 + ωȳ (s)ȳ (s) + ω x x c · y κ . We include the age of the household head, and the number of household members. The inclusion of control variables actually increases the estimated 23 We do not use averages of total expenditures at the state-level from the CEX because the CEX data is not representative at state level, and also because many states have a small number of observations over the period 1993-2002. 24 When estimating the model, we normalized the expenditures and mean income data to thousands of dollars per quarter.
value of the NMGs. The coecients in υ x and ω x suggest that households with fewer members and a younger household head nd the NMGs more valuable, and they also nd observable goods relatively less valuable at higher wealth levels. The results are also robust when using dierent sets of control variables (e.g. year dummies, marital status, gender).
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In a similar spirit, we test the sensitivity of the results to the addition of extra variables about the income distribution in the reference group. We add the Gini index of income inequality in the state of residence to Ψ(·), in addition to the mean state income. Column (5) Our results depend upon the assumption that mean state income aects preferences over nonmarket goods but not preferences over market goods. The main concern is that there may be some factor correlated with mean state income that aects preferences over market goods. 
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The correlation is also robust when they take into account that reference groups are formed both on the basis of geography and race. We follow their identication strategy, by allowing the value of NMGs to depend upon both the mean state income,ȳ(s), as well as the mean income in state-race cells,ȳ(s, r). 28 The pressumption is that people are more likely to interact with individuals of the same, and also that they value the NMGs more when they come from individuals of their same race.
Thus, we expect the coecient ωȳ (s,r) to be larger (in absolute value) than ωȳ (s) . Indeed, column (6) shows that the coecient ωȳ (s,r) is approximately twice as large as ωȳ (s) . Intuitively, this is consistent with a world where people are twice as likely to seek NMGs from people of their own race than from people of a random race. Since we are letting the value of NMGs depend on an additional variable (i.e.,ȳ(s, r)), it is not surprising that the estimated value of the NMGs is greater than in the baseline specication. In another specication we let the preferences over market goods to depend uponȳ(s), β(y; υ) = υ 0 + υ y + υȳ (s)ȳ (s) y, while we let the value of NMGs to depend only onȳ(s, r). Intuitively, if there are unobserved factors correlated to mean state income that aect preferences over market goods, those will be captured by υȳ (s) . This specication is very conservative, because we are forcing the model to attribute the correlation betweenȳ(s) and observable consumption entirely to dierences in preferences over market goods.
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The results, reported in column (7), are encouraging. Even though this is a conservative specication, the implied value of the NMGs is actually higher than in the baseline specication.
We also perform a number of unreported tests. One limitation of the CEX data is that the variable on the state of residence is censored for some households, in order to protect the identity of the respondents. For obvious reasons, this censoring is more common in smaller states. In order to assess whether the results are sensitive to this source of measurement error, we estimate the baseline model but excluding the smallest states, and we nd virtually the same results. Another potential concern is that some households report expenditures during one quarter only (approximately 15% of the sample), so we could argue that such observations are less reliable. We estimate the model excluding those households and we nd very similar results. Also, note that we use data on mean state income, where instead it would be more appropriate to use a measure of mean state consumption. The correlation between mean income and mean consumption is not perfect due to a number of reasons, such as dierences in state taxes. We estimate the model using data on after-tax mean state income using a database collected by the IRS Statistics of Income Division and we nd similar results. Lastly, we estimate the model using dierent time periods, and the results are always similar.
Welfare implications
We discuss some welfare implications of the baseline model estimated in column (1) of Table 2 . Compared with the rest of the specications, this model is the simplest and has the most conservative estimate for the value of NMGs. Figure 4 shows the t of the model for the data points corresponding to the state of Texas. We use this state in the examples simply because the size of the NMGs in this state is close to the corresponding national average in the US. The black solid curve in Figure 4 shows the prediction of the model for the share of observable consumption (i.e., z * (y) y ), and the grey solid curve shows the prediction of the model in the counterfactual scenario in which observable goods are unobservable (i.e.,z (y) y ). The distance between these curves represents the degree to which the households distort consumption to signal their wealth and is thus intrinsically related to the value of the underlying NMGs. Figure 5 shows the estimated market value of the NMGs in Texas. As a share of total expenditures, the Net Benets from NMGs are larger for richer households. The Net Benets from NMGs can be over 10% of the total expenditures for the richest households. The Unattained
Benets are small relative to the total expenditures and the Net Benets. The ratio of Net Benets to Unattained Benets measures the eciency of the signaling mechanism and is roughly similar across wealth levels.
We continue with the welfare implications, but now we discuss the results for the entire US sample instead of just the residents from Texas. According to the model estimated in column (1) of Table   2 , the average amount spent on cars and clothing is $550 per household per month (15% of total expenditures). The average net benets from NMGs are $215 per household per month (5.9% of total expenditures). The average Unattained Benets are just $32 per household per month (0.9% of total expenditures). The unattained benets give an upper bound to the value that can be gained from economic policy, such as a tax on observable goods aimed at correcting the positional externality.
The Unattained Benets are only 13% of the sum of Net Benets and Unattained Benets (i.e., the gross valuation of the NMGs), which means that the signaling mechanism attains most of the potential benets from NMGs. Lastly, note that the Net Benets from NMGs increase more than proportionally with total expenditures. Thus, if we account for the market value of NMGs in a broader measure of (market plus non-market) consumption, the level of consumption inequality will be higher. Accounting for the NMGs increases the average Gini index by 3.75% (i.e., from 0.347 to 0.360).
31 This dierence is economically signicant because it is equivalent to more than half of the standard deviation of the Gini coecients of market consumption inequality across the US states.
Tax on observable goods
One of the most well-known policy implications of the conspicuous consumption model is that there are some eciency gains from taxing conspicuous goods (e.g., Bagwell and Bernheim, 1996) .
32 Intuitively, any household, even a poor one, can consume enough of the observable good to trick the NMG's supplier into believing that the household is richer than it actually is. To guarantee that there will be no cheating, every household in the perfect separating equilibrium must distort its consumption towards the observable good. Doing so generates a positional externality that compels all of the households to consume too much of the observable good. If it were feasible, all of the households could gain utility by coordinating a joint decrease in the consumption of the observable good. A tax on the observable good can work as a Pigou tax by nudging people to consume less of the good that they are consuming in excess.
Proportional tax
As shown in Subsection 2.3, given a hypothetical proportional tax on the observable good τ , we can use the estimated parameters to re-compute the signaling equilibrium. If we also have a policy objective, we can use this counterfactual to compute the optimal tax rate. Instead, we will illustrate the eciency gains from the observability tax in a more intuitive manner.
Because the positional externality causes the households to consume too much of the observable good, we want to nd the value of the observability tax that would oset this distortion. For a given value of the tax rate, we can compute the equilibrium consumption share in the observable
y−z * (y|τ )τ , where z * (y|τ ) denotes the optimal consumption in the counterfactual 31 We have to be careful when reading these Gini coecients, since we computed them using a special sub-sample of the households from the CEX sample (i.e., we exclude households that report zero total expenditures, households in the top 0.1% of the distribution of total expenditures, and so on).
scenario with proportional tax rate τ . We would prefer to compare this consumption share with the consumption share that would have arisen in the absence of NMGs. However, these two values are not directly comparable because in the former case the households are poorer (i.e., they pay taxes), which aects the consumption shares. In other words, we need to disentangle between income and substitution eects. As a solution, when computing the counterfactual with no NMGs, we levy a lump-sum tax 33 equal to the tax levied in the signaling equilibrium z * (y|τ )τ . That is, we compare Figure 6 shows the actual consumption share (s * (y|τ ), the solid line) and the consumption share in the counterfactual scenario with no positional externality (s(y|τ ), the dashed line) for multiple tax rates ranging from 0 to 0.5. When τ = 0, every household is consuming an ineciently high share of the observable good. For higher values of the tax rate, the curves(y|τ ) is displaced downwards because the higher lump-sum tax renders everyone poorer, and poorer households consume relatively less of the observable good (i.e., the income eect). For higher values of the tax rate, the curve s * (y|τ ) moves down more rapidly because of the combination of the income and substitution eects. The ideal tax rate would make the solid line as close to the dashed line as possible. Under a linear tax schedule, there is no tax rate that renders the solid line and the dashed line exactly equal to each other in a point-wise sense (this equality will be possible under a non-linear schedule). Therefore, the exact value of the optimal tax rate will depend on the specic policy objective under consideration. Figure 6 suggests that the optimal tax rate will be in the order of 40%. This tax would raise signicant revenues (i.e., approximately $230 per household per month), and it would be highly progressive.
Non-linear tax
We can characterize the unique non-linear tax schedule τ (z), which entirely eliminates the positional externality. After the income eect has been accounted for, the positional externality is eliminated if every household consumes the same amount that it would have consumed had the observable good been unobservable:
If we dierentiate w.r.t. y we obtain the following dierential equation:
The household's consumption behavior is characterized by the dierential equation provided in Subsection 2.3. These two dierential equations form a system of two dierential equations and two unknowns. The two boundary conditions are:
The rst boundary condition follows the same logic presented in the original problem with no taxes.
The second boundary condition simply reects the fact that the poorest household, with wealth y 0 , 33 Or equivalently, a tax on total consumption.
does not distort consumption at all, so the optimal tax rate for that household should be exactly zero.
To nd the solution to this system of dierential equations, we nd the following transformation to be useful: T (y) = τ (g(y)). For the sake of notational simplicity, letz =z (y − g(y)T (y)), U 1 = U 1 (y − g(y), (1 − T (y)) g(y)), and U 2 = U 2 (y − g(y), (1 − T (y)) g(y)). After many algebra steps, we obtain the following system of dierential equations:
This system can be solved numerically using standard methods. Once we nd T (y), it is straightforward to retrieve τ (z) from the denition of T (y). Figure 7 presents the optimal non-linear tax in Texas. Initially, the average tax rate goes up sharply.
Afterwards, the rate continues to increase at a decreasing pace. Signicant dierences in the tax rates exist across the wealth levels. Whereas the households below the median wealth face average tax rates ranging from 0% to 35%, the households above the median wealth face average tax rates above 35%.
The total tax revenue under this tax schedule would be approximately $230 per household per month.
The tax would be even more progressive in this schedule than it was in the linear schedule.
Theoretical and practical concerns
There are some theoretical and practical concerns regarding the counterfactual analysis with a tax on observable goods. From the theoretical perspective, we made a number of implicit assumptions.
For example, we assumed that this tax will not aect decisions in other life spheres, such as labor supply decisions and the supply of NMGs.
34 Among the practical concerns, it is important to note that the degree of visibility of a good is dicult to measure and even more dicult to incorporate into legislation. In practice, people will respond to the tax by shifting their consumption towards other observable goods that are not covered by the tax code. Because those goods were not chosen before the tax was introduced, they may be less ecient for the economy as a whole. Further practical problems with the implementation of luxury taxes are discussed in Frank (1999) . In any case, the optimal tax rate presented above would still serve as an upper bound to the optimal tax rate that we would obtain in a model that accounts for all of these shortcomings. Also, complementary reasons for taxing some observable goods may exist. For example, in the case of car consumption, we worry about other externalities, such as pollution and trac congestion, which provide further reasons to tax those goods.
Conclusions
The goal of the paper is to provide a quantitative idea of the practical importance of conspicuous consumption. We estimate a signaling model using nationally representative data on consumption in 34 That assumption can be misleading, for example, if people are not just interested in signaling wealth per se but they are also interested in signaling traits that are correlated with wealth, such as talent (Perez-Truglia, 2010). the US, which we then used to estimate the welfare implications and perform a counterfactual analysis.
We nd that the market value of NMGs is non-negligible: for each dollar spent on clothing and cars, the average household obtains approximately 35 cents in net benets from NMGs. However, the large value of NMGs does not imply that the losses from the positional externality are also large. The results suggest that because richer households would still consume relatively more of the NMG even in the absence of NMGs, the cost of the signal that they send is not high. As a result, the signaling equilibrium attains almost 90% of the full potential benets from the NMGs, which is very ecient.
The signaling costs, which in the baseline specication are estimated to be $32 per household per month, can serve as an intuitive upper bound to the benets that can be obtained through economic policy, such as a tax on observable goods aimed at correcting the positional externality.
Our empirical application employs basic data on household expenditures to provide estimates for many interesting predictions, such as the value of the NMGs. Our identication assumption, which is based on Charles at al. (2009), relies on observational data. This assumption is subject to criticism.
Future researchers may exploit richer data to attain a better identication of the primitives of the model and thus a more robust estimation of the welfare and policy implications. In other empirical settings, we may be able to measure the scope of the reference groups with more precision. For instance, if people make donations to universities, which serve a signaling purpose (Glazer and Konrad, 1996) , we can precisely identify the suppliers of the NMGs as the alumni of the university who observe the donations. Moreover, we could nd exogenous variation in the degree of visibility of a given good by conducting a eld experiment. only NMG good to a consumer that is as wealthy as possible. The consumer can spend its wealth in goods u i (unobservable) and z i (observable), and its preferences over those goods are represented by the utility function U (u i , z i ). All consumers value a unit of the NMG in Π, which enters additively in the utility function.
The timing of the game is the following. Consumers decide rst. They must choose how to split y i between observable and unobservable consumption. After the consumers choose, consumers and suppliers are matched according to the following scheme: each supplier is matched with a random set of N consumers from the reference group. On expectation, a consumer will be matched with a supplier (along with other N − 1 consumers)
N S
times. Upon observation of the conspicuous consumption of the N consumers in its group, the supplier of the NMG must decide which of those consumers will get the NMG. In a perfect separating equilibrium the supplier will choose the consumer with the highest z i . Even though all consumers value the NMG in Π, wealthier consumers will be more willing to sacrice intrinsic consumption in order to get the NMG. This model will be equivalent to an all-pay auction, where the distribution of valuations will be determined by the distribution of wealth in the whole reference group.
Let's nd the symmetric equilibrium. Denote b(y) = z to the conspicuous bid as a function of y.
If a consumer chooses to bid z, the probability of winning the all-pay auction is given by the probability of all the other N − 1 bids being smaller than z. Thus, the consumer maximizes the following expected utility:
Note that this is just a particular case of the more general model presented in Section 2, where we assume a particular functional form for Ψ(y): i.e., Ψ(y) =
. As a consequence, the conditions that guarantee existence and uniqueness of the perfect-separating equilibrium are identical to those discussed in the main model. As usual, we can characterize the solution using the FOC for the interior solution plus the boundary condition:
It follows from the dierential equation that conspicuous consumption, b(y), depends upon the entire distribution of y in the reference group: i.e., through the terms F y (·) and F y (·). This prediction was not present in the conspicuous consumption model from Section 2, where the only characteristic of the wealth distribution that mattered was the wealth of the poorest individual.
In Section 3 we argue that, conditional on the wealth of an agent, the average wealth in its refer-ence group should be negatively correlated to the household's valuation of the NMG, Ψ(y). This is straightforward to prove in this model. Simply note that Ψ(y) =
, so Ψ(y) is not a function of absolute income (y), but a function of relative income (F y (y)). Let's interpret increasing mean income as going to a new income distribution that rst-order stochastic dominates the old distribution. For a given y, F y (y) will be lower under the new distribution, and therefore Ψ(y) will be lower as well. This means that, for any y, increasing mean income in the reference group would lower Ψ(y), which is exactly the assumption made in the empirical model. 36 denotes the average ratio between the Net Benets from NMGs and the observable expenditures, computed using the formula given in Section 2 (standard errors are calculated with the Delta Method). Column (2) uses 3 additional parameters for a spline that represents preferences over market goods. Column (3) uses a polynomial specication to represent preferences over the non-market goods. Column (4) includes 4 additional parameters to allow the preferences over market and non-market goods to depend upon two control variables: a dummy for whether the household head is less than 40 years old, and a variable for household size that takes the value 0 if the household is comprised of a single member, 1 if it is comprised of two members, and 2 if it is comprised of 3 or more members. Columns (6) and (7) only include observations for households whose heads are White, Black, Latino or Asian. Table 1 for data denitions and details about the sample). Each grey dot is a datapoint. The solid line is a fourth-degree polynomial approximation, with its corresponding 95% condence intervals in dashed lines. Table 1 for data denitions and details about the sample). Each grey dot is an individual datapoint. The black solid line shows the observable expenditures predicted by the model estimated in column (1) of Table 2 , and the black dashed lines show the corresponding 95% condence interval. The grey solid line shows the prediction of the model in the counterfactual scenario in which observable goods become unobservable, with the grey dashed lines showing the corresponding 95% condence interval. Condence intervals are calculated using the Delta Method. Table 1 for data denitions and details about the sample). The Net Benets (NB) and Unattained Benets (UB) from NMGs are calculated in 2005 dollars using the formula given in Section 2 and the estimates from column (1) of Table 2 . The 95% condence intervals are calculated using the Delta Method. The grey curve denotes the probability density of total expenditures, which is calculated using a Kernel smoothing density estimate. Table 1 for data denitions and details about the sample). The solid lines are the observable consumption shares under a given value of the tax rate in the signaling equilibrium, s * (y|τ ). The dashed lines are the observable consumption under the counterfactual scenario with no NMGs and a lump-sum tax of z * (y|τ )τ : i.e.,s(y|τ). Both s * (y|τ ) and s(y|τ ) are calculated using the parameters estimates from column (1) of Table 2 . The total expenditures in the x-axis are tax-inclusive. The grey curves denote the probability density of total expenditures, which is calculated using a Kernel smoothing density estimate. Table 1 for data denitions and details about the sample). The non-linear tax schedule is the one that fully corrects the positional externality. The observable expenditures in the x-axis are tax-inclusive. The grey curve denotes the probability density of observable expenditures under the optimal non-linear tax schedule, which is calculated using a Kernel smoothing density estimate.
